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1 INTRODUCTION 
Generally, regional integration is when a 
group of countries get together and 
develop a formal agreement (by way of 
treaties) regarding how they will 
conduct trade with each other. Ernst 
Haas, perhaps the most prominent 
integration scholar of the time, defined 
integration as follows: 
[T]he process whereby political actors 
in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations and political activities 
toward a new centre, whose institutions 
possess or demand jurisdiction over 
pre-existing national states. The end 
result of a process of political 
integration is a new political 
community, superimposed over the pre-
existing ones.1  
                                                 
 The authors wrote and finished this article 
when they were post-graduate students in the 
Faculty of Law at the University of the Western 
Cape, South Africa in 2012. 
1 Ernst H "International Integration: The 
European and the universal process," (1961) 15 
International Organization 366. 
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Regional integration has manifested itself historically in Africa, America and Europe as a 
bureaucratic effort to facilitate political unification and expansion of capitalism.2 The 
establishment of regional economic blocs not only strengthens member countries’ 
positions on the global political landscape and bargaining power on international issues, 
but also enables countries to collectively grapple with the region’s economic progress. 
Individual countries within any given economic bloc cannot deal with the economic 
challenges single-handedly; hence the mooting of the idea of regional economic 
integration. Regional integration has been seen in Africa as a means of encouraging 
trade and securing economies of scale.3 Additionally, regional integration has become 
increasingly accepted as essential in facilitating economic and political development.4 
Regional integration has been credited with providing an important step towards a 
wider global involvement 5 and has exhibited the potential to promote economic growth 
and reduce poverty through increased exports of domestic goods.6 It has been 
envisaged that integration has the potential to promote growth and reduce poverty 
through the increase of exports of domestic goods. Consequently, several regional 
groupings have mushroomed in the post-war era across the globe, notably the European 
Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In Africa several 
regional groups have emerged, namely, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), as well as the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), which is the focus of this article. This article seeks to unpack some of the 
challenges that the SADC has encountered in its regional economic integration 
endeavours.  
It can therefore be argued that the Southern African region is ideal for regional 
economic integration given the fact that it is characterised by many countries with small 
economies, an environment which is ideal for interstate trade and forging of economic 
links. This article seeks to present and discuss challenges that the SADC regional 
grouping has encountered in its effort to foster regional integration, by engaging in 
debate around the importance of regional integration and the reasons behind some of 
the challenges.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Chingono M & Nakana S “The challenges of regional integration in Southern Africa” (2008) 10(3) African 
Journal of Political Science and International Relations 396-408.  
3 Khandelwal P “COMESA and SADC: Prospects and challenges for regional trade integration” IMF 
Working Paper (2004). Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04227.pdf. 
(accessed 7 September 2012). 
4 Chingono & Nakana (2008). 
5 Hartzenberg T ‘The New SADC Agreement: Implications for Regional Integration in Southern Africa’ 
Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa (2011) 173.  
6 McLeod H “Regional integration and the role of donors”  Yearbook Monitoring Regional Integration in 
Southern Africa (2011) 17. 
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2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SADC  
From its inception, the SADC has been guided by the desire to establish a regional 
integration bloc to link regional economies, strengthen the region’s economic 
performance, and enhance the region’s political stability. Initially established in 1980 as 
the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC),7 the grouping wanted not only 
to reduce economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa,8 but to forge 
economic links for the creation of a genuine and equitable regional integration through 
the mobilisation of resources for the promotion of interstate and regional policies.9 
After most of the Southern African states had attained political independence, 
the region decided to revise the mandate of the regional body by putting more focus on 
economic and political issues in the post-colonial period.10 The establishment of the 
SADC in 1992 was therefore seen as a continuation of efforts to strengthen collective 
self-reliance within the Southern African region. However, there cannot be any 
economic development without political stability; hence the new revised regional body 
incorporated political issues within its principal mandate. Qobo argues that “political 
rather than economic considerations set in motion the process of regionalization in 
Southern Africa”. 11 In addition, the regional body took cognisance of the fact that 
economic developments can only be realised through a concerted effort; hence the 
member states saw regional integration as the gateway to economic development 
within the region.  
The major parts of this article include the vision and mission of the regional 
grouping, the diverse historical backgrounds of the SADC member states, the different 
levels of economic development within the member states, the impact of overlapping 
and concurrent membership on regional integration. However, the quest by the SADC 
regional bloc to achieve these objectives has resulted in overambitious programmes and 
projections being put in place.  
3 VISION AND AGENDA 
The major and overarching objective of the SADC has been to promote “economic and 
social development through co-operation and economic integration”.12 The SADC Treaty 
                                                 
7 Takirambudde PN “The Position of SADCC in the international division of labour and prospects for 
regional cooperation’ (1999) 7 (1) PULA: Botswana Journal of African Studies 97-116. 
8 Hancock KJ “What role for the EU in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU): Advocate, cajoler, or 
bully?” A paper prepared for the Conference on the Diffusion of Regional Integration, Kellog-
Forschergruppe, Traansformative Power of Europe, Berlin (10 – 11 December 2010)  at 5.  
9 Ahmed, AK “An analysis of the regional integration in Sothern Africa: A South African perspective” 
(2008) Tralac 12. 
10 Draper P & Kalaba M “South African international trade diplomacy: Implications for regional 
integration” (2006) at 37. 
11 Qobo M “Regional integration, trade and conflict in Sothern Africa’ (2007) South African Institute for 
International Affairs 15. 
12 Art 5 (1) (a) and(b), SADC Treaty. 
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presents economic integration as holding the key to the achievement of economic 
growth, self-sustaining development, and management and sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources.13 The SADC Treaty has therefore put the focus of the SADC bloc as 
seeking to attain regional economic integration, freedom and social justice, all of which 
are anchored in the common values and principles that exist between the peoples of 
Southern Africa. As a result this focus has put the bloc’s mission as promoting 
sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development; deeper 
co-operation and integration; as well as good governance and durable peace.14 These 
commonalities inform the region’s quest for collective stability and sustainable 
development, all of which can be realised through economic regional integration.15  
The operations of the SADC towards regional integration have been 
characterised by the presentation of overambitious programmes, despite the evident 
fissures within the regional grouping as will be discussed below. The guiding principles 
of the SADC have been to reduce economic dependence initially on apartheid South 
Africa, but later on other economies outside of the SADC region. Additionally the 
member states have envisioned forging economic links as a way of creating genuine and 
equitable regional integration. In addition to establishing economic links, the SADC has 
been guided by the desire to mobilise resources to help promote the implementation of 
national, interstate and regional policies.16 Over and above these visions, the SADC 
member states have committed themselves to collaboration in order to secure 
international co-operation. The above objectives have provided guiding principles by 
which the SADC has been operating since its inception in 1992 and which continue to 
inform policies within the regional grouping. 
4 CHALLENGES TO ECONOMIC REGIONAL INTEGRATION WITHIN THE SADC  
While it can be acknowledged that the establishment of regional blocs has been 
necessitated by the desire to provide a bulwark against poverty and powerful 
economies outside the region, the major reason has been to integrate the economies 
within the respective regions. From the inception of the SADC regional grouping in 
1992, there have been numerous achievements. However, the achievements have been 
outweighed by challenges that the regional bloc has continued to encounter. This article 
discusses the most primary of these challenges which include over ambitious targets set 
by the SADC as a roadmap to economic regional integration; multiple and concurrent 
memberships of different regional economic communities (RECs); the heterogeneous 
nature of the SADC economies which has provided an uneven economic environment; 
duplication emanating from the activities of  the SACU and the SADC; the intricacies of 
rules of origin; different levels of economic development within SADC member states; as 
                                                 
13 Art 5 (1) (a),(b),(g) and (l), SADC Treaty. 
14 Art 5 (1) (a) and (b), SADC Treaty. 
15 Chauvin S & Gaulier G “Regional trade integration in Southern Africa. CEPII” (2002) 23. 
16 Bhagwati J Termites in the trading system: How preferential agreements undermine free trade (2008) at 
43. 
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well as the failure of the SADC Tribunal to provide recourse to justice and act as a 
unifying platform for member states. The domineering nature of Zimbabwe in the 
proceedings and verdict of the SADC Tribunal points to the fact that  lack of sincerity, as 
well as egocentricity on the part of some boisterous SADC member states have shown 
that it is difficult for the bloc to achieve regional integration based on mutual trust. As 
long as some member states are more equal than others, achieving regional integration 
based on mutual trust and selflessness would be difficult.  
4.1 Overambitious targets 
It has been noted that many African governments have concluded a very large number 
of regional integration arrangements, several of which have significant membership 
overlap.17 While characterised by ambitious targets, they have a dismally poor 
implementation record. Part of the problem may lie in the paradigm of linear market 
integration, marked by stepwise integration of goods, labour and capital markets, and 
eventually monetary and fiscal integration.18 A number of targets that the SADC regional 
bloc has set to attain over a period of time have not been achieved. This is confirmed by 
Hancock who argues that the SADC has forged ahead with setting targets “but has barely 
made a dent into realising those goals”19 with some targets having been missed. In the 
SADC Trade Protocol signed by 11 out of the 15 member states in 2000, the countries 
sought to liberalise 85% of intra-regional trade by 2008, liberalise 100% of trade by 
2012, and form a customs union for the region by 2010. All these targets have since 
been missed. In addition, the region has set itself to establish a common market by 2012 
and a monetary union by 2016, both of which have not been achieved, with frustration 
being evident among SADC leaders who have increasingly exhibited pessimism towards 
the attainment of some of the targets. Acknowledging failure to meet these targets, the 
SADC has postponed these targets “due to the need for further studies on the impact on 
integration of the economies of member states”.20 It can be argued that failing to meet 
the set targets has been one of the most evident indicators of the mammoth task that is 
associated with regional economic integration. Failure to meet the targets has also set a 
bad precedent for the region’s endeavours, most of which would most likely end up a 
dismal failure. 
4.2 Overlapping and concurrent memberships  
Overlapping and multiple memberships is not a recent phenomenon in African regional 
blocs. The practice dates back to the colonial times and “was influenced by the first 
wave of regional integration based on the model of the European Economic 
                                                 
17 Hartzenberg T, “Regional integration in Africa” Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, Staff working 
paper ERSD-2011-14. 
18 World Economic Forum, World Bank, and African Development Bank, The Africa 
Competitiveness Report 2011 (2011). 
19 Hancock (2010)  at 13.  
20 “Southern Africa: Leaders of SADC postpone launch of Customs Union” All Africa.com, 18 August 18 
2010.  Available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201008180923.html (accessed 6 September 2012). 
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Communities”.21 Multiple and concurrent memberships of numerous RECs have 
presented the most daunting challenge to economic regional integration within the 
SADC. There are several intricacies and implications associated with multiple and 
concurrent memberships, notably that of overlapping. Overlapping membership of 
different RECs has not only created confusion, competition and duplication, but also 
constitutes a burden on the taxpayer.22 South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
are members of both the SACU and the SADC, while Namibia and Swaziland both hold 
memberships of three regional integration agreement (including the COMESA) and are 
part of the Common Monetary Area (which include South Africa and Lesotho) and also 
participate in the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF).23 Additionally, a 
majority of the SADC member states are also members of the COMESA.24 This causes 
problems in the event that each region decides to form a customs union, taking 
cognisance that no one country can simultaneously belong to two RECs at any one 
time.25 It has also been noted that differences in approaches to integration add to the 
confusion, inconsistency and incoherence in policies.26 An example in this regard is that 
of the COMESA which is informed by classical Vinerian thinking and stresses the 
benefits of integration derived from the removal of trade and non-tariff barriers.27 In 
contrast, the SADC, whose history is rooted in the desire to promote economic 
independence and political security needs, favours a developmental approach to 
integration, which focuses on sectoral co-operation.28 Consequently multiple 
memberships are not only costly but inefficient and are partly responsible for the 
limited capacity and success of the SADC and other RECs. 
Closely associated with the failure of member states to comply with the 
requirements of the SADC Treaty to commit themselves to regional integration by 
“coordinating and harmonising their activities”, there has been evidence of overlapping 
and concurrent membership as different SADC states and SACU members have gone out 
of their catchment areas to explore other economic opportunities within other regional 
groupings. Ahmed notes that the “existence of multiple integration schemes and 
overlapping membership and the continuing negotiations with countries outside the 
                                                 
21  Jackobeit C “Overlapping membership in COMESA, EAC,SACU and SADC: Trade policy options for the 
region and the EPA negotiations’ (2008) at 3. Available at http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Jakobeit-Hartzenberg-Charalambides_05_Overlapping-membership.pdf (accessed 
9 September 2012). 
22 Chingono & Nakana (2008) at 404. 
23 Mutai, H “Memberships in multiple regional trading agreements: Legal implications for the conduct of 
trade negotiations” (2003) Tralac. Available at www.tralac.org/scripts/contnent.php?=1914 (accessed 19 
August 2012). 
24 Countries with overlapping COMESA-SADC membership are Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
25 Chingono &Nakana (2008) at 404. 
26 Chingono & Nakana (2008) at 404. 
27 Viner J ‘International Trade Theory and its Present Day Relevance’  Economics and Public Policy (1955). 
28 Chingono & Nakana (2008) at 405. 
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SADC region could significantly alter the nature of integration in Southern Africa”.29 
McLeod has also concurred that overlapping agreements can have costs as countries 
have to negotiate in a number of forums and agree to implement a range of policies 
which may be conflicting or irrelevant. 30 Overlapping membership also has the 
propensity to implicitly pull other member states into an agreement even against their 
will. An example is that of the SACU where South Africa is a member alongside 
Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. Given that South Africa has already 
negotiated the Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement with the EU, and also 
with the SACU, any agreement that South Africa concludes includes other SACU 
members.31 Overlapping membership has also diluted regional integration efforts 
among different SADC member states. Hancock argues that when integration is shallow, 
a state can sign numerous bilateral or even multilateral agreements but when 
integration deepens to the level of a monetary union or customs union, states must 
choose one integration agreement.32 Implicitly holding overlapping and/or concurrent 
membership weakens regional integration. This practice is contrary to what has 
occurred among SADC member states which have found themselves signing numerous 
agreements with different regional trading blocs, thereby presenting a challenge to 
deeper regional integration.  
Holding multiple and overlapping memberships has also created trade 
inconsistencies among regional blocs. An example is where countries hold membership 
of both the COMESA and the SADC. Of the 15 SADC member states, nine countries also 
belong to the COMESA whose total membership is 20. While the agenda vision for the 
SADC has indicated that it would be a free trade area (FTA) by 2012, the COMESA on the 
other hand, had long planned that it would have attained customs union status by 
2004.33 A practical example of a country which was caught up in this quagmire is 
Zambia which has been a member of both the SADC and the COMESA. Under the SADC 
Trade Protocol Zambia had agreed to dismantle tariffs for SADC members to zero.34 
Consequently, since South Africa is a member of SADC, Zambia had agreed to remove 
tariffs to South Africa to zero. On the other hand, Zambia being a member of the 
COMESA Customs Union, had agreed to a common external tariff regime for countries 
that are not members of the COMESA. Since South Africa is not a member of the 
COMESA, this did not apply to South Africa.35 This would translate into the fact that 
Zambia had agreed to reduce tariffs for South Africa (under the SADC conditions) but to 
                                                 
29 Ahmed (2008) at 13. 
30 McLoed (2011) at 7. 
31 Vickers B ‘Between a Rock and a hard place: Small states in the EU-SADC EPA negotiations’ (2011) 187 
The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 189. 
32 Hancock (2010) at 14. 
33 Bhagwati (2008) at 45. 
34 Braude W “SADC, COMESA and the EAC: Conflicting regional and trade agendas’ Institute for global 
Dialogue Occasional Paper No 57 (2008). Available at http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Jakobeit-Hartzenberg-Charalambides_05_Overlapping-membership.pdf (accessed 
10 May 2012). 
35 Ahmed (2008) 15. 
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maintain tariffs for South Africa (under the COMESA provisions). This scenario leaves 
Zambia in a quagmire. Similarly, other regional groups, such as, the SACU, which already 
have agreements with the EU,  would have to seek ways to negotiate with non-SACU 
countries that are members of both the SADC and the COMESA and to identify with 
which group they will have to negotiate.36 Overlapping and concurrent membership has 
shown varied economic interests among SADC and SACU member states. However, on a 
positive note, it should be acknowledged that the establishment of the tripartite FTA 
arrangement between the SADC, the COMESA and the EAC has a potential of addressing 
the challenges emanating from multiple membership. 
4.3 The heterogeneity of SADC economies  
Discussion of regionalism and regional integration in Southern African cannot be fully 
justified without underscoring the fact that the SADC region is characterised by acute 
economic imbalances and inequalities.37 The most important of these imbalances has 
been in terms of the different nature and levels of economic status. The heterogeneity of 
SADC economies has been viewed as a challenge to regional integration because such 
economies cannot be integrated, especially given that stronger economies, like South 
Africa, end up dictating the terms of reference and operation to poorer and weaker 
members of the regional grouping. For instance in the SACU South Africa plays a 
dominant role and its voice dominates the proceedings, resulting in it having to play a 
domineering role and occupy a decisive position in decision making processes within 
the group. Similarly, within the SADC South Africa has always presented a dominant 
voice.38 Additionally, seeing that South Africa has been the dominant economic hub of 
the regional body, the country has not shown much commitment to regional integration, 
given that its economy has been able to attract trading partners outside of the SADC 
more than other SADC member states. Consequently, it would appear that for South 
Africa, a disintegrated regional body would benefit it more than if the SADC were 
economically integrated with all member states accruing mutual benefit from the 
proceedings of the regional bloc. Hancock concurs with this argument by asserting that 
given that South Africa has reaped significant long-term economic benefits that often 
came at the expense of both SACU and SADC member states, its attention to regional 
integration has been distracted.39 Gibb further argues that the existence of different 
economies in the SADC and the SACU has led to growing inequalities among member 
states, confirming the customs union theory which predicts that in such a scenario the 
more advanced economies gain more of the investments and thus grow significantly 
faster than the others, exacerbating inequality.40 Both Hancock and Gibb have valid 
points on the impact of the heterogeneity of SADC economies on regional economic 
                                                 
36 McLeod (2011) at 98. 
37 Nyirabu M “Appraising regional integration in Southern Africa’ (2004) 13(1) African Security Review 
21.. 
38 Vickers (2011) at 189. 
39 Hancock (2010) at 4. 
40 Gibb R “The new Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with democracy’ (2006) 
32(3) Journal of Southern African Studies 24.  
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integration since regional integration would be difficult to achieve in such a state of 
inequality among member states. From the argument above it can be inferred that the 
heterogeneity of SADC economies not only exacerbates inequalities among members of 
the same regional grouping, but enables larger economies to thrive at the expense of 
their smaller counterparts. Additionally, trade imbalances will persist and this would 
lead to wider economic gaps among member states and larger economies like South 
Africa will continue to dictate the pace of economic growth and the level of intra- and 
extra-regional trade. 
However, it should be noted that heterogeneity has its own positive side notably 
that the heterogeneity of Southern African states is a challenge to integration, and has to 
be seen from other perspectives that might suggest that it is precisely the differences in 
the economies of the region that provide scope for developing different types of 
comparative advantage. In addition, it has been argued that African Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) are flexible legal regimes and as such provide a forum for co-
operation on a whole range of objectives, including trade liberalisation.41 They nestle 
within these regimes an entire range of other objectives including those relating to 
security and the sharing of common river ways.42 In addition, the functional specificity 
of the RTAs is that they provide forums for integrated development of common 
resources, the equitable distribution of gains from trade, and the principle of variable 
geometry.43 
4.4 The co-existence of SACU and the SADC  
The existence of the SADC and the SACU alongside one another and seeking to achieve 
similar objectives has created challenges for the SADC regional integration project as 
states within the Southern African catchment geographical area find themselves divided 
between the two institutions. Despite the fact that SACU members are prohibited from 
entering into new preferential trade agreements with third parties, this regulation has 
been flouted on numerous occasions.44 In addition, powerful economic blocs, such as, 
the EU have sought to divide the SADC and SACU by negotiating with them separately 
despite the fact that the SACU membership is encapsulated in the SADC. The fact that 
SACU members have taken the initiative to negotiate Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) with the EU without having to utilise the SADC as a larger economic bloc has 
tended to equally divide the SADC region by creating fissures within the SADC 
membership. However, Hancock accuses the EU of being behind this development of 
seeking to divide the SACU and the SADC.45 This has further been confirmed by Vickers 
who argues that due to the vast power asymmetries between the EU and the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, smaller states have found themselves with very 
                                                 
41 Gathii, JT “African regional trade agreements as flexible legal regimes” (2010) 35 North Carolina Journal 
of International Law and Commercial Regulation 571. 
42 Gathii (2010) at 571. 
43 Gathii (2010) at 571. 
44 Art 31 (3) SACU Agreement (2004). 
45 Hancock (2010) at 14. 
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little bargaining power to shape the negotiating process and the outcome of the 
negotiations, which in the end has “split the SADC into four sets of separate trade 
regimes with the EU”46. The overall impact of this development has been the 
undermining of the SADC regional integration agenda.  Given the division among SACU 
members, different SACU members currently have different external tariffs, thus 
undermining any prospects of deeper regional integration that can emanate from 
creating a common market, a monetory union or a stronger customs union. Additionally 
there has been argument about whether the SADC or the SACU should be mandated to 
handle regional economic integration issues. Van de Merwe has pointed out that SACU 
leaders have presented suggestions to SADC leaders that the SACU should become the 
economic nucleus for the wider SADC body.47 As a result this tug-of-war for supremacy 
between the SACU and the SADC has further derailed efforts for regional integration, 
especially given that the countries cannot concur on matters of policy, such as, which of 
the two should handle economic matters or spearhead regional integration. 
4.5 Different levels of economic development 
The difference in political backgrounds as well as the nature of resources found in 
different countries has culminated in differences in levels of economic development. It 
is undisputed that South Africa is the largest economy in the SADC region accounting for 
over 60% of all intra-SADC trade and about 70% of the SADC GDP. 48 Given these vast 
economic power asymmetries between South Africa and other members of the SADC 
and the SACU, the country cannot be treated as an equal partner.49 This has resulted in 
South Africa being a dominant figure and being able to flout regulations without much 
protest from other member states. Additionally, South Africa has been able to take its 
time in negotiating EPAs with the EU, unlike smaller states where South Africa can 
negotiate on their behalf by virtue of the fact that they are members of the SACU. 
In addition, the regional body’s major economic challenge has been to create an 
environment suitable for the attainment of high and sustainable rates of equitable 
economic growth which, if achieved, would promote economic regional integration. 
With most SADC member states still experiencing low and decreasing levels of per 
capita  Gross National Product, low growth rates of GDP, relatively high deficient and 
interest rates, and relatively low savings and investments rates, the economic 
developments of the region has become increasingly uneven,50 a situation which tends 
to retard economic development as well as regional economic integration. 
                                                 
46 Vickers (2011) at 185. 
47 Van der Merwe C “Zuma urges SACU to tackle EPA negotiations as united front”  Engineering News 
Online 23 April 2010. Available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/zuma-urges-sacu-to-tackle-
epa-negotiations-as-united-front-2010-04-22. 
48 Vickers (2011) at183. 
49 Vickers (2011) at 183. 
50 SADC: Major achievements and challenges – 25th Anniversary 1980 – 2005 (2006) at 74. Available 
online at http://www.sadc.int/cms/uploads/SADC%20Major%20Achievements%20Handbook%20-
%20English%281%29.pdf (accessed 17 July 2012). 
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4.6 Failure of a Collective Justice System: Case of the SADC Tribunal  
While the idea behind the establishment of the SADC Tribunal (the Tribunal) was a 
positive development and a big stride towards regional co-operation and integration, 
disagreements over its composition and functions have tended to present fissures 
within the regional grouping. The Zimbabwean commercial farmers’ case at the SADC 
Tribunal in Windhoek held high expectations for the SADC Tribunal as a unifying 
regional institution within the SADC. Given that the Tribunal was a first attempt at 
seeking to collectively deal with cases of human rights violation at the regional level, 
and allowing individuals within SADC member states recourse to justice against their 
respective states, aggrieved individuals held high hopes for putting to an end to the 
impunity with which the state had trampled on civil liberties. However, the refusal by 
Zimbabwe to comply with the human rights violations judgment and the subsequent 
withdrawal of the country from the Tribunal presented a test case for SADC regional 
integration.51 The fact that the regional bloc failed to rein in a renegade member state 
which had blatantly refused to comply with a judgment to compensate the commercial 
farmers indicates that the SADC cannot enforce some of the provisions of its 
institutions, in this case the judgment handed down by the SADC Tribunal.  Zimbabwe 
which had been found guilty of the violation of human and property rights by the SADC 
Tribunal, got away with it and even caused a review of the mandate of the Tribunal. The 
review culminated in further curtailment of access to justice by SADC citizens by an 
approach to the Tribunal. The review of the provisions of the Tribunal that was initiated 
by Zimbabwe culminated in the dilution and reduction of the powers of the Tribunal by 
confining the Tribunal to dealing with inter-state disputes and not disputes and/or 
complaints from individuals. One can view this new mandate of the Tribunal as seeking 
to further refuse SADC citizens recourse to justice, especially given that aggrieved 
citizens cannot successfully challenge their own countries in local courts of law and 
succeed! The failure of the Tribunal to rally SADC member states against a renegade 
member state (Zimbabwe) has shown that some strong member states can flout 
standing regulations and judgments with impunity and without reprimand. The case of 
Zimbabwe’s refusal to comply with the Tribunal’s judgment has also brought to the fore 
the view that some member states are untouchable and this violates the provision of 
equality within the regional bloc. As a result it can be argued that regional integration is 
at the mercy of, and is dictated by powerful member states and political events and 
preferences. As highlighted in the SADC Treaty, the SADC does not only encourage 
peaceful settlement of disputes, but encourages economic integration which can best be 
realised in a stable political environment.52 In view of the evident human rights 
violations perpetrated by the Zimbabwean government towards white commercial 
farmers, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the victims, only for Zimbabwe to refuse to 
uphold the judgment, arguing that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to render a 
judgment in the case.  The refusal by Zimbabwe to comply with the Tribunal judgment 
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not only showed the weakness within the SADC region to speak against human rights 
violations, but also showed an element of disunity and the propensity to bend rules in 
order to suit specific situations. This is confirmed by the fact that the SADC heads of 
states not only promised to review the mandate of the Tribunal but amended the 
mandate of the Tribunal so that it would deal only with inter-state disputes, which are a 
rare occurrence. It would therefore be difficult for regional integration to take place if 
SADC member states fail to agree on matters of policy, such as, in respect of the case of 
the Zimbabwean white commercial farmers. 
4.7 Rules of origin  
The application of rules of origin in the SADC economic bloc has encountered 
inconsistencies. The SADC has been touted as the most prominent regional body in the 
Southern African region and the only regional body of which all states within the region 
are members.53 This portrays a picture of unity of purpose among the SADC member 
states, at least theoretically. However, the situation on the ground has shown that there 
is divergence in the operation of the regional grouping as each SADC member state has 
shown the propensity to promote its own economic and political interests, contrary to 
the vision of the regional grouping encapsulated in the grouping’s ramification of 
Protocols in which each member state has committed itself to “operate, coordinate, 
harmonise and integrate policies and strategies in one or more sectors”. The ratification 
of Protocols by nine out of 20 SADC member states has further confirmed that regional 
integration is in jeopardy since not all member states have shown the same amount of 
commitment to regional integration.54 In addition, multiple and concurrent 
memberships have influenced the implementation of economic policies. For example, 
the SADC rules of origin on a number of products are more restrictive than those of the 
COMESA. This means that companies trading in countries which are members of both 
Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) may put such companies in a precarious 
position since the transaction costs of negotiating and attending meetings of the SADC, 
the COMESA, the SACU and World Trade Organisation (WTO) for small countries such 
as Namibia, are very high.55 It has also been noted that such agreements may reduce 
countries flexibility countries forming effective collaborative engagement with those 
within the same bloc. In addition the rules of origin have been blamed for the lack of 
trade response to tariff reductions in SACU countries.56 In some cases the rules of origin 
are opposed by some member states as insufficient to confer origin. Draper and Kalaba 
have also concurred that restrictive rules of origin are not only a barrier to international 
competitiveness and regional integration but are also costly in terms of ensuring 
conformity. 57 It can therefore be concluded that the rules of origin in the SADC present 
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a challenge to regional integration because they are considered not only to be relatively 
complex but prohibitive as well. 
5 ACHIEVEMENTS 
While it can be acknowledged that the SADC has, since its inception in 1992, achieved 
numerous positive developments, the achievements and benefits have been outweighed 
by the challenges bedevilling the regional bloc. The regional grouping has been able to 
demonstrate that regional integration and co-operation are possible and desirable.58 
Additionally, the SADC has been able to inculcate a sense of regional belonging as well 
as a tradition of consultation among the peoples and governments of Southern Africa.59 
The regional grouping has also been able to put in place a regional programme of action, 
namely, the SADC Programme of Action, which encourages co-operation in various 
economic sectors.60 Under the auspices of the SADC a number of infrastructural projects 
have been undertaken to rehabilitate roads, rail and harbours as a way of improving 
communication, transportation and carriageways across the region. These 
achievements, though much still has been achieved, have at least provided a foundation 
on which the SADC region can make progress towards its regional integration 
endeavours. However, despite these achievements, the SADC continues to be bedevilled 
by various challenges which have impacted negatively on its regional integration efforts 
as indicated above. Of note has been the domineering position of some member states 
which have been able to flout regulations and disregard judgments, as in the case of 
Zimbabwe and the SADC Tribunal judgment. It has also been noted that the SADC has 
maintained positive growth trends, recording a growth rate of over 4.1% by 2004.61 
Being aware that regional political stability can divert attention away from economic 
integration initiatives, the SADC has made considerable strides towards preserving 
political stability in the region. 
6 PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE SADC 
If the recent findings of the high propensity of former liberation struggle leaders being 
unable to provide for good democratic dispensation are anything to go by, then the 
SADC, comprising of a number of liberation movements, has a insurmountable task for 
the bloc to realise the ideals of regional integration. Given the influential positions and 
liberation credentials of Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa in the SADC 
region, the findings of Mo Ibrahim’s Afro Barometer (2012) further presents a bleak 
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picture of the prospects for regional integration in the bloc.62 It is indisputable that 
democratic politics facilitate economic development which forms the most determinant 
stage towards regional integration. This means that for effective regional integration to 
be achieved in the SADC bloc, there should be a consensus on the form of democracy 
that should prevail in the region. This argument is further hindered by the existence of a 
traditional form of democracy which prevails in Swaziland, namely, a monarchical 
democracy. The monarchical form of democracy appears to go against the current wave 
of participatory democracy that has come to be the acceptable norm, as dictated by the 
global wave of political reform. In other words, the monarchical form of democracy 
defies tenets of democracy as presented by different international and regional 
instruments, all of which call for the existence of political parties and political 
contestation. This is absent in Swaziland, thereby putting the country on a collision 
course with other SADC members. Given this visibly unacceptable form of democracy, 
such a dispensation affects intra-regional trade and, subsequently, regional integration. 
It also becomes difficult for the 14 member bloc to reconcile their different political and 
economic practices for a collective effort towards regional integration. 
7 CONCLUSION 
If the different challenges to regional integration are anything to go by, it can be 
asserted, therefore, that regional integration is becoming increasingly elusive. This is so 
because of the increasingly economic developments as well as political challenges in 
different SADC member states. In addition, given that each country is unique and has 
unique economic requirements, overlapping membership has presented an opportunity 
for different countries to address their different needs. Overlapping and concurrent 
membership by SADC member states has tended to show that they are not pulling 
together towards the goal of regional integration, as each member state has 
concentrated on identifying its own economic opportunities without regard for other 
members’ economic interests. Additionally, concurrent membership has also resulted in 
inconsistencies in the application of economic policies. Powerful economic blocs, such 
as the EU, have played a divisive role by seeking to influence the SACU in the EPA 
negotiations and taking cognizance of the fact that all SACU members are also SADC 
member states. Additionally, the over-domineering role of South Africa in both the 
SADC and the SACU has tended to overshadow the voice of other smaller economies 
within both institutions, contrary to the SADC founding spirit of co-ordination, co-
operation and unity of purpose. The SADC’s overambitious projections of liberalisation 
of intra-regional trade as well as establishing a customs union and a common regional 
currency have not only proved to be insurmountable, but require thorough planning 
and a concerted effort on the part of the SADC members. The heterogeneity of SADC 
economies has also presented challenges of inequality and trade preferences contrary 
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to the fact that the SADC Treaty envisages equality and unity of purpose among member 
states. The heterogeneity the of SADC economies has been the result of different 
political and colonial backgrounds.  
 
 
